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Abstract—Cyber literacy merits serious research at-
tention because it addresses a confluence of specialization
and generalization; cybersecurity is often conceived of
as approachable only by a technological intelligentsia,
yet its interdependent nature demands education for a
broad population. Therefore, educational tools should
lead participants to discover technical knowledge in an
accessible and attractive framework. In this paper, we
present Protection and Deception (P&G), a novel two-
player board game. P&G has three main contributions.
First, it builds cyber literacy by giving participants
“hands-on” experience with game pieces that have the
capabilities of cyber-attacks such as worms, masquerad-
ing attacks/spoofs, replay attacks, and Trojans. Sec-
ond, P&G teaches the important game-theoretic con-
cepts of asymmetric information and resource allocation
implicitly and non-obtrusively through its game play.
Finally, it strives for the important objective of security
education for underrepresented minorities and people
without explicit technical experience. We tested P&G at
a community center in Manhattan with middle- and high
school students, and observed enjoyment and increased
cyber literacy along with suggestions for improvement
of the game. Together with these results, our paper
also presents images of the attractive board design and
3D printed game pieces, together with a Monte-Carlo
analysis that we used to ensure a balanced gaming
experience.
Index Terms—Cyber literacy, security awareness, cy-
bersecurity, deception, board game
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity has been directly in the limelight
of contemporary media. The Sony Pictures Entertain-
ment hack over the controversial film The Interview,
the infamous debut of the Snowden Revelations and
ensuing debate, and important security breaches at
The Home Depot and Target Corporation have made
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national news at all levels of society. The U.S. Federal
Government’s commissions of reports on big data and
privacy [2] and bulk collection of signals intelligence
[3] - together with the surging interest in cyberse-
curity from academic and commercial perspectives -
suggests an intense effort to combat cybercrime from
the top-down. But cybersecurity is an interdependent
phenomenon. This interdependency demands cyber
literacy that branches out from technology compa-
nies and computer science schools to consumers of
the technology that they develop. It also requires a
grassroots effort at igniting interest in cyber-careers
as an investment in tomorrow’s human capital.
Serious games offer a promising means to overcome
the intimidating nature of learning about cybersecurity.
Because it is difficult to perceive how security threats
affect individuals, and because cyber experience and
vocabulary are not well-integrated among those in
non-technical fields, cybersecurity can seem to pose
a high barrier to entry [4]. Serious games employ the
entertainment value of games towards accomplishing
distinct educational objectives. They sit upon an inter-
section between engineering, science, and education.
Our work is a serious game with the objectives of
answering such basic questions as “What is a mas-
querading attack?” and “How is a local area network
different from the internet?”
Several recent educational efforts have promise for
technical professionals or aspiring STEM students.
Proliferating Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions
have placed security education in a non-technical envi-
ronment. An application of gamification, they leverage
the enjoyable properties of games in a real-life security
challenge. But they may not be appropriate for novice
participants. They do not (at least yet) especially
represent an outreach of security education beyond the
STEM fields and into populations underrepresented in
technical fields. Games are needed that feature a gentle
introduction to cyber-security; one that helps build
cyber literacy without intimidation and teaches other
concepts relevant to cybersecurity only implicitly.
In this work, we present Protection and Deception
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2(P&G), a two-player board game that combines a
turn-based chess-like structure with elements such
as infrastructure configuration that are characteristic
of real-time strategy games. The basic gameplay is
simple and follows a storyline related to cybersecurity.
In P&G, both players configure local area networks
(LANs) and allocate attack and defense packages.
They hide “critical information” on one of their
computers. Then, gameplay evolves in a sequence of
turns in which players deploy attacks and navigate
them through the network. Throughout the game,
players learn about attack capabilities. They also face
trade-offs between brute strength and maintaining
information-assymetry - as when deciding whether to
surveil an opponent’s LAN with a weak attack. Players
achieve victory when they destroy the opponent’s
computer containing the critical information.
P&G offers a gentle introduction to cyber literacy.
Explicit cyber-jargon is limited to various types of
cyber attacks: e.g., viruses, Trojans, masquerading
attacks and worms. The rest of the gameplay has
parallels in traditional board games - although there
are some parallels to collectable card games (e.g.
Magic: The Gathering and Yu-Gi-Oh!). In this way,
P&G attempts to lower the learning curve for serious
security games so that they can reach populations
outside of corporations or the university.
Indeed, we tested this game at a community center
on the lower-east side of Manhattan. We found both
encouraging results - in terms of interest in the game
and acquired knowledge - and elements of the game
that need to be improved and further simplified in
order to attract young players. We were also inspired
towards future work in digitalizing the game or pro-
viding game instructions in the form of a YouTube
video.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
II describes the gameplay of P&G in detail. We were
especially intrigued by one aspect of the gameplay
design: attempting to balance the capabilities of cyber-
attacks and defense packages. Towards this end, we
created a Monte-Carlo simulation which we describe
in Section III. Section IV describes our playtesting
proceedure and observations. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VI.
II. GAMEPLAY
Protection and Deception (P&G) is a two-player
board game. The goal is of the game is to locate
and destroy the opponent’s computer that holds his
critical information. This task is achieved through a
combination of effective local area network (LAN)
design, intelligent deployment of attacks and defenses,
and quickly routing attacks and defenses to their
Figure 1. Basic board layout. Each player configures her own
local area network, and connects via routers to the public internet.
Network configuration is an optimization experience in which
players need to make trade-offs between capabilities to defend
critical information, utilize deception (hide critical information in
unexpected computers), and rapidly deploy attacks.
Figure 2. Basic board layout with three computers connected via
mesh points and links
intended target. This requires balancing strength with
maintaining the ability to deceive the other player. The
first stage of P&G consists of LAN configuration.
A. LAN Configuration
Each player controls the following pieces:
1) 4 routers
2) 8 computers
3) 8 mesh points
4) 16 links
5) Deck of attack and defense cards
There are three components to the platform of the
board game as shown in Fig. 1.
Each player will have a Local Area Network (LAN),
which is essentially her base. The players configure
these LANs. The board that is in the middle of the
two LANs is the public Internet, which has static
configuration.
The game begins with each player setting up her
own LAN. A network topology consists of routers,
computers, mesh points, and links. A mesh point is
essentially a way to link two computers directly. Fig.
2 represents a sample network topology for Player A
of three computers connected with the use of three
mesh points.
Each player creates a network topology that consists
of 8 computers, at least 4 mesh points and at most 8
mesh points, and 4 routers, which are accompanied by
4 routing links and must be connected to at least four
3Figure 3. Sample configuration of LAN1. The red computer holds
critical information. The routing links are represented with green
lines, while the computers are linked to each other or to mesh points
with red lines.
mesh points. A router is used to connect computers to
the public Internet. The 16 links are used in order
to connect a computer to a computer, a computer
to a mesh point, or a router to a mesh point. Each
computer must use 2 to 3 links to connect to another
computer or mesh point. Fig. 3 is a sample network
topology. The routing links are represented with the
green lines. In Fig. 3, the computers are linked to other
computers or mesh points with the use of red links.
After each player sets up his or her network topology,
each player must designate one computer out of the
eight computers as the computer that holds “critical
information”. In Fig. 3, the computer that holds the
critical information is colored in red.
Each router is connected to the public Internet with
the use one link (in yellow in Fig. 3). Once each player
has set up her network topology and decided on the
computer that holds “critical information,” each player
allocates the deck of attack and defense cards. Each
computer, besides the computer that holds “critical
information,” is assigned one attack card and one
defense card. The next two subsections describe the
attacks and the defense packages.
B. Attacks
Each attack card features a different type of attack.
These attacks can be spawned from the computers
equipped with the attack card. Fig. 4 depicts an image
of one of the attack cards.
1) Worm - takes down a piece and then replicates
if a host is taken down
2) Masquerading Attack/Spoof - propagates
throughout a network without attacking a
particular piece
3) Denial of Service (DOS) Attack - stops traffic
within a mesh point.
4) Virus - attacks a computer and then the piece is
reset
Figure 4. Sample attack card: Worm Attack
5) Replay - captures a packet and does not let it
propagate throughout the network
6) Trojan - reveals the defenses that a particular
computer has installed. A Trojan is also coupled
with a weak level virus
7) Modification Message - changes the type of
message/attack a computer sends. If this attack
comes across the opponent’s attack at a node in
the Internet, it can randomly select a different
type of attack
C. Defense Packages
Players also equip computers with a defense pack-
age. The defense packages differ in terms of which
attacks they block. We have counterbalanced these
packages in order to prevent any one attack from
becoming exceptionally powerful. (See Section III.)
Fig. 5 depicts one of the defense package cards.
1) Defense Package 1 - Blocks worm, replay, and
masquerading attack/spoof
2) Defense Package 2 - Blocks worm, denial of ser-
vice (DOS), and modification message attacks
3) Defense Package 3 - Blocks worm, virus, and
Trojan attacks
4) Defense Package 4 - Blocks worm, modification
message, and masquerading attack/spoof
5) Defense Package 5 - Blocks worm, Trojan, and
DOS attacks
6) Defense Package 6 - Blocks virus, replay, and
masquerading attack/spoof
7) Defense Package 7 - Blocks Trojan, replay, and
DOS attacks
8) Defense Package 8 - Blocks Trojan, replay, and
modification message attacks
On every turn, each player is allowed to make
one move. A move is defined as either spawning an
attack or moving an attack one unit. An attack piece
is represented as a ring. When a player spawns an
4Figure 5. Sample defense package card: Defense Package 1
attack piece, she simply places the ring on top of
the appropriate computer. An attack that is in a LAN
follows the configured links. An attack that is in the
public Internet moves along the sides of the squares.
The attack is allowed to move either horizontally (left
or right) or vertically (up or down). Each player does
not know what the other player’s moving attacking is.
An attack is revealed under one of two conditions:
1) A player attacks the opponent’s attack
2) A player attacks the opponent’s computer
A defense package is revealed if an attack is conducted
on a computer. Below is a sample gameplay:
1) Player A has a worm attack. Player A attacks
Player B’s computer.
2) Player B reveals the Defense Package that is
assigned to the particular computer that is at-
tacked: Defense Package 1.
3) Defense Package 1 is able to defend against a
Worm, Replay, and Masquerading Attack/Spoof.
Therefore, Player A’s worm attack is destroyed.
If an attack attacks a computer and the computer
is successfully able to defend against the attack, the
attack is destroyed. However, although the attack is
destroyed, it can still be spawned from the starting
point, which is the computer that the attack originated
from, on another turn. If an attack attacks a computer
and the computer is unable to defend against the
attack, the computer is destroyed. The game ends
once one player discovers and destroys the opponent’s
computer that holds the “critical information”.
III. SIMULATION AND STRATEGY
Every game requires fairness for a balance of good
gameplay. No single attack should dominate to the
point where the game ends quickly. In this section, we
first describe the results of a simulation that we used to
balance the capabilities of the attacks and the defense
packages, and then we describe a strategy that might
Figure 6. LAN topology used for Monte-Carlo simulation. In
this simulation, we ran different attacks against different possible
configurations of the defense packages. We ultimately designed the
defense packages based on the configurations that created the most
equal performance for the different attacks.
be employed based on insight from this simulation
design process.
A. Simulation for Design
Flow is a notion developed by psychologists to
describe a mental state in which one is completely
involved in an activity for its own sake [1]. It is
characterized as an activity where time flies. Fairness
in a game is essential to induce flow [6]. We wanted
to allocate defense capabilities such that no single
attack was able to dominate. In order to do this,
we simulated virus and worm attacks against a fixed
network topology for different allocations of defense
packages1. This gave us a mapping from (number of
defenses with the ability to block viruses) to (number
of computers that a virus would likely destroy), and
it gave us a similar mapping for worms. We then
used the inverse of this mapping to allocate the
capabilities of defense packages such that viruses and
worms would be likely to destroy the same number of
computers.
For the Monte Carlo simulation, we used the fol-
lowing topology in Fig. 6, one that is within limits
and is symmetrical in nature.
For the random simulations, a random routing point
was chosen from a uniform distribution. The virus was
simulated such that it would not revisit nodes if it had
the potential to explore unvisited nodes. The worm had
1We simulated virus and worm attacks because they have least
and most powerful special attack properties, respectively. The virus
has no special attack power, while the worm has the power to
continue to propagate if it is not destroyed. We allocated defenses
against the other attacks by assuming that their special attack
properties lie somewhere between those of the virus and worm.
Thus, we configured between two defense packages (the number
which were endowed with the ability to block viruses) and five
defense packages (the number configured with the ability to block
worms) with the ability to block the other attacks.
5Figure 7. Number of computers destroyed by virus attack versus
number of defenses equipped with the ability to block the virus. For
instance, if four defenses were to be configured with the capability
to block the virus, then the average virus attack would destroy
approximately one computer.
Figure 8. Number of computers destroyed by worm attack versus
number of defenses equipped with the ability to block the worm
the capability to visit all nodes. For each number of
defenses ranging from 0 to 8, 1000 simulations were
done to average the number of nodes destroyed. Figs.
7 and 8 depict the results of these simulations.
Figs. 7 and 8 show that to give the virus and worm
similar strengths, the number of defenses that protect
against viruses should be less than that of worms.
Based on the figures, four defense packages should
be equipped with the ability to block worms and two
with the ability to block viruses. This makes each able
to destroy approximately 2.5 computers on average2.
Based on the results of this simulation, the next
subsection describes a sample strategic consideration
that players might use to build a LAN and allocate
defense packages.
2The first iteration of defense packages used preliminary simu-
lation results. Thus, in the allocations discussed in Section II, there
are five rather than four defense packages equipped with the ability
to block worms.
Figure 9. A topology to robustly protect against worm attacks
B. Strategy
Clearly there are some implicit guidelines for mak-
ing a topology. For instance, it seems unwise to leave
a direct path without worm defense to the critical
computer. Such topologies arise in automatic wins
if the correct attack is carried out. One particular
defensive strategy that could be used is to create two
communities.
The topology in Fig. 9 is an example of a dual-
community topology. A community could be defined
as a concentration of nodes with a high degree of inter-
connectivity. This dual-community topology in Fig. 9
also has the property that it forces attacks through
certain computers on the way to computer number 8,
in which the critical information is maintained. As a
result, there are no short routes to get to node 8.
We conducted a simulation to analyze the effective-
ness of this topology. The results of this simulation are
shown in Fig. 10, which shows that fewer computers
were eliminated on average for the same defensive
configurations for the long dual-community strategy
than for the default strategy.
From an offensive standpoint, an attack strategy
might be to send out 4 attacks simultaneously. The
attack that has the least probability of being defended
against will attack a node. Once this node is attacked
the defenses of that node are now known. If it suc-
cessfully defends against one attack, the player has at
least one other attack to take out this node. In fact,
this method of attack is very effective when using the
first attacker to be a virus because there are only two
defenses against viruses.
C. Implicit Game-theoretic trade-offs
Besides explicitly teaching players basic cyber liter-
acy, P&G also aims to give them implicit experience
6Figure 10. Computer casualties with default versus robust defense
configurations
in game-theoretic optimization. This optimization is
apparent in network configuration for defense and
selecting optimal attack strategies.
The defensive network strategy embodied by the
dual-community strategy depicted in Fig. 9, for in-
stance, involves a trade-off. The advantage of the con-
figuration is that it strongly protects computer number
8, which can be used to store the critical information.
Unfortunately, this also reveals the likely location of
the critical information to the opposing player! A
more “flat” and network topology would have the
advantage of more effectively disguising the location
of the critical information. Such deception is heavily
studied in the area of security in general [13], [14],
[15], and is especially important in cybersecurity [16],
[17]. In terms of game theory, choosing a flat topology
amounts to preferring information asymmetry to brute
force.
Information asymmetry is also important in se-
lecting attack strategies. Initially, an attacking player
has no knowledge of her opponent’s allocation of
defensive packages. She has the option to use initial
attacks primarily as “scouts” in order to ascertain the
allocation of defense packages. Of course, this may
involve sacrificing the turns that it takes to regenerate
attacks. We are excited to see how players develop
strategies that leverage these concepts - possibly with-
out explicit knowledge of the scholarship behind them.
IV. PLAYTESTING
The initial target audience of Protection and De-
ception (P&G) was any person over the age of six.
The game was tested out among various ages ranging
from ages six to 21 years old. The testers were from
two groups. The first was a combination of children
who frequented a community center located in the
Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York. The second
consisted of mostly college students. Our initial tests
at the community center were conducted with four
children.
We initially considered implementing structured
pre- and post-play surveys that would have enabled
statistical analysis. Encouraged, however, by advice
from the educational community, we eventually opted
for less structured observation that would not discour-
age students. Essentially, we collected evidence by
open-ended observation.
Questions to the children before the game lasted
no more than five minutes per player. We asked the
players their age, what they know about cyber secu-
rity, what academic subject they preferred, and what
interests they pursued outside of school. The questions
about favorite subject and interest were a means to
figure out their backgrounds. We had children who
were interested in math, science, basketball, painting,
and other activities. These children at the community
center did not have any explicit knowledge about
cybersecurity. We asked whether they had heard of
“hackers,” but they had not. We also tested the game
with two high school students, one of which expressed
interest in business and another in engineering. Fi-
nally, our second pool of testers were college students
looking to pursue careers in the fields of engineering,
medical, and art.
In the post-survey, all players were asked what
they learned about cyber security, what they liked and
disliked about the game. One 7-year old girl from the
community center said, “I like the cards the most.”
A 10-year old boy said, “I forgot which card I put
down for the different computers” - which indicated
to us an aspect of the board design that we can
improve so that it is obvious which attack and defense
cards have been allocated to each computer. A 20-
year old college student studying medicine had a brief
understanding about cybersecurity before the game,
but after playing “learned how different attacks such
as the worm worked and learned about cyber attacks
that I didn’t’t know existed like masquerading.” A 17
year old in high school who expressed an interest in
business said he would play the game if more of his
friends knew about the game and how to play. He was
asked a follow-up question if there was anything in the
game he wanted to learn more about. He said he plays
video games on his PlayStation 4 console a lot and
realized he “had an experience of denial of service
when a group of hackers took down the PlayStation
online network and I could not log on or use the
network for a few days.” We were encouraged by this
rather comical realization that cybersecurity concepts
are especially embedded in non-academic activities.
For all age groups, the instructions seemed rather
7complex; many times during the game, players would
ask the testers whether moves were legal or ask
about the results of particular actions. Importantly, we
learned that it was helpful to follow the instructions
with a quick demonstration of the game play. This
adjustment in our introduction of the game decreased
the difficulty of learning, although did not remove the
learning curve completely. Based on this expressed
difficulty, we are considering including video instruc-
tion or other means to make the game easier to learn.
We describe these briefly in Section VI.
Finally, we noted that the game seemed enjoyable
to players once the rules became clear. Players were
excited when their attack successfully destroyed a
computer or when their computers successfully re-
pelled the opponent’s attacks. Among the older play-
ers, we noted a competitiveness that emerged from the
freedom allowed to choose different strategies. From
observing the various age groups, it appeared that the
testers that were around or over the age of 13 enjoyed
the game the most. We will seek a much larger subject
pool for further testing in order to refine the target age
for P&G.
V. RELATED WORK
In the introduction, we described various classes of
games from which Protection and Deception (P&G)
derives its framework. Namely, P&G is a serious game
- a game which teaches concepts which have actual
value outside of serving the entertainment purpose of
the game. P&G aims to build cyber literacy, as well as
to implicitly teach about trade-offs between strength
and information revelation. Furthermore, P&G rep-
resents an effort in the vast category of security
education, a critical area of study in the light of intense
regional and international conflicts in cybersecurity.
Finally, P&G builds upon a tradition of games-based
learning.
We can see similarities to P&G in at several recent
games. From last year’s 3GSE, Microsoft’s Elevation
of Privilege [7] is a card game based on concepts
from information security with a fascinating purpose:
it is played between developers in order to discover
security flaws of a system. Elevation of Privilege is an
example of gamification, since it employs motivations
from game-playing for a serious task. Developers in
this game draw cards which prompt them to name
vulnerabilities, and thereby accomplish a technical ob-
jective. Elevation of Privilege is obviously not geared
towards a novice population.
Control-Alt-Hack [8] is a card game from 3GSE’14
which is geared towards a novice population. This
game seeks to give participants an social experience
related to hacking, rather than teaching specific con-
cepts. The network security game called [d0x3d!] [9]
is also a similar effort to ours. It is a board game
with changeable configuration achieved by tiles which
are arranged at the beginning of gameplay. Players
in [d0x3d!] deploy special abilities on their way to
collecting digital resources (“[loot]”). Both games are
attractively designed, and represent efforts to intel-
ligently deploy and commercialize or test security
games. They both use existing games re-skinned in
cybersecurity concepts and terminology, whereas our
game is an entirely new design.
Control-Alt-Hack and [d0x3d!] both seem to feature
a higher degree of security vocabulary than P&G.
Indeed, P&G represents an effort to reach out to
non-technical, underrepresented, and young players.
We are concerned not only about players who may
not have the technological background to understand
security concepts, but also players who may not have
the attention span to learn a complicated game. In
our own playtesting, we observed that even with
the simple mechanics of our game, there was some
learning curve. Thus, we aim to keep the security
lexicon in P&G to a minimum. This will help us
achieve the goal of engaging a diverse population in
security awareness.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our initial work on Protection and Deception
(P&G) opens up vast possibilities for future develop-
ment. In terms of basic elements of gameplay, we have
considered several options. First of all, the connection
between security challenges and economic questions
has been extensively noted in the literature [10], [11],
[12]. Because of this, we are considering incorporating
money or budgeting resources into the gameplay.
We are also considering allowing players to elect to
build up their LAN capabilities instead of deploying
attacks. This trade-off pits myopic against farsighted
strategies, and allows implicitly teaching the present
value of future rewards. Finally, we have noted that
a visual demonstration of play seemed to lower the
learning curve for our participants. Because of this,
we are considering deploying video instructions online
that can be used to learn the game. On the more
extreme end, the entire game could be digitized, or
a hybrid board game and digital game combination
could be considered.
In its present version, P&G is a board game de-
signed to engage young, non-technical, and under-
represented players in the world of cyber security.
P&G features a completely new design which relies
on probabilistic simulation to ensure fair gameplay.
The game offers three major contributions. First, by
8exposing participant to various types of cyber-attacks
such as denial of service and masquerading attacks,
it builds cyber literacy in an inviting way. Second, it
teaches aspects of game theory such as information
asymmetry and deception implicitly. Finally, P&G
engages players with little or no previous introduc-
tion to cybersecurity. Indeed, we conducted an initial
set of tests with such a population at a community
center in the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New
York. Encouraged by these initial results, we hope to
continue to improve P&G so that it can contribute
to the important and vast contemporary challenge of
cybersecurity education.
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